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Summary: Hospitals in Taiwan are facing major changes and innovation is increasingly becoming a 
critical factor for remaining competitive. One determinant that can have a significant impact on 
innovation is hospital governance. However, there is limited prior research on the relationship between 
hospital governance and innovation. The purpose of this study is to propose a conceptual framework to 
hypothesize the relationship between governance mechanisms and innovation and to empirically test the 
hypotheses in hospital organizations. We examine the relationship between governance mechanisms and 
innovation using data on 102 hospitals in Taiwan from the Taiwan Joint Commission on Hospital 
Accreditation and Quality Improvement. We model governance mechanisms using board structure, 
information transparency and strategic decision‐making processes. For our modeling and data analysis we 
use measurement and structural models. We find that in hospital governance, information transparency 
and strategic decision making did impact innovation. However, governance structure did not. To facilitate 
innovation, hospital boards can increase information transparency and improve the decision‐making 
process when considering strategic investments in innovative initiatives. To remain competitive, hospital 
boards need to develop and monitor indices that measure hospital innovation to ensure ongoing progress. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hospitals around the world are facing unprecedented changes in many key areas, including technological 
advances, hospital‐physician relationships, financing, and increasing competitive pressures. The changes 
are fueling concerns with regard to accessibility, quality of care, and cost containment.[1] Consequently, 
hospital executives are realizing innovation is necessary to improve their competitive position and 
organizational performance.[2] [3] As a result, hospitals are dedicating attention and resources to identify 
determinants that support innovation in hospital organizations. 
Recently, 1 specific area under consideration is leadership and governance by board of directors that 
oversee innovation in hospitals. The social and economic contracts under which hospital boards operate 
are in the process of being transformed due to changes in health care delivery, organization, and 
financing.[4] These changes have impacted key areas that affect innovation, including maintaining 
harmonious relationships between physicians and managers, keeping up with competitive pressures, 
ensuring accountability to the communities, and responding to inspection of both clinical and 
administrative quality.[5] Moreover, the role of hospital governors in terms of both institutional and 
individual performance drives the focus of boards more toward the notion of public value (such as health 
quality innovativeness) rather than just compliance. The emergence of new theory for boards argue that 




effort and board dynamics.[6] These 3 key elements may provide implications for hospital governance on 
its innovation as well. As a result, hospital boards are being challenged to simultaneously respond to and 
anticipate innovation. For example, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement launched the Boards on 
Board program in February 2007, which seeks to engage board leadership in innovation of clinical quality 
control.[7] 
There is limited research on the relationship between governance mechanisms and innovation in hospitals. 
This study seeks to fill the current theoretical and empirical gap by asking the following research 
question: Do hospital governance mechanisms affect innovation in hospitals? We address this question in 
2 ways. First, we propose a conceptual framework to hypothesize the relationship between hospital 
governance mechanisms and innovation. Second, we conduct an empirical study to test our hypotheses 
using data of 102 hospitals in Taiwan from the Taiwan Joint Commission on Hospital Accreditation and 
Quality Improvement (TJCHA). 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Separately, hospital governance and innovation receive considerable attention from both academics and 
practitioners. However, despite consensus about the importance of this board responsibility, there is 
limited research on the relationship between hospital governance with organizational innovation. Our 
study contributes to prior literature by developing conceptual model relating governance with innovation 
and empirically testing the model in the hospital industry. 
We define hospital governance as overseeing the overall functioning and effective performance of the 
organization by setting the vision, mission, strategic plan, and goals and supporting and monitoring the 
execution of the plan and attainment of goals.[8] Chambers[6] also argues that high‐performing boards 
across all sectors concentrate on shaping strategy, resource identification and use, and talent management. 
The governance function ensures that there is an adequate resource for the hospital to provide access and 
quality of care for the public.[7] Theoretically, the purpose of the governance function is to mitigate the 
principal‐agent problem through information transparency, alignment of management incentives, and 
accountability.[9] The hospital governance literature provides a variety of mechanisms to resolve agency 
problems, including governance structure, information transparency, and decision making.[1] [8] [10] 
Ideally, the 3 mechanisms are used to put in place managerial checks so that the hospital operates 
according to its mission and strives to achieve its goals in an efficient and effective manner. Hospital 
goals include strategic investments in innovation for ongoing viability. 
We define innovation as the organizational propensity to generate and adapt novel ideas or behavior 
through creation of new knowledge or unique application or combination of current knowledge.[2] Based 
on research by Teece,[11] we include the characteristics of innovation as appropriability, firm specificity, 
cumulativeness, and localization and continual effort toward uncertain outcomes. We further consider 
hospital innovation across 8 dimensions: strategy and community function, hospital management, patient 
rights and safety, systems and operations, health care processes, nursing care, pleasant environment, 
human resources, and quality control. 
The recent work by O′Sullivan[12] provides a means to relate governance with innovation by 
conceptualizing innovation as a strategic investment. Using this perspective, our study focuses on the way 
governance mechanisms are used to allocate resources to strategic investments in innovation. We use 3 
mechanisms to represent governance in our conceptual framework and empirical model: board structure, 




Governance structure and innovation 
Governance structure is represented as the size of the board [10] and CEO duality.[13] Size is the number 
of directors on the board. Typically, hospital boards tend to be large due to the voluntary nature and the 
large number of different stakeholder interests they represent.[14] Historically, the major role of hospital 
trustees has been to maintain or enhance the legitimacy and prestige of the institution within the 
community as well as to attract resources to the hospital from the surrounding environment for 
innovation. Preference for board size is related to the resource dependence perspective [15] ; the greater 
the dependency on external sources, the larger the board of directors. However, prior research has found 
that larger size boards are not as conducive to innovation as smaller size boards because of limited focus 
and support for any 1 area of innovation.[14] In effect, smaller boards are more “manageable for 
innovation” from the CEO's perspective.[16] Therefore, smaller board size is seen as supportive of 
innovation, while larger size is not. 
CEO duality is when an individual serves as both CEO and member of the board. In this dual role, the 
CEO has traditionally held more power vis‐à‐vis the board and the organization because of his or her 
ultimate authority over all aspects of the organization's operations.[13] Also, strong executive influence 
on the board is viewed as improving the linkage between policy making and operations, decreasing 
conflict between board members and management, and facilitating selection of directors whose views are 
consistent with the innovative philosophy of the organization. Furthermore, in order to preserve control 
and focus on innovation, the dual role of the CEO would reduce the risk of divided authority. Daily et 
al[13] find that by holding both of these powerful organizational positions there is greater assurance that 
both the board and/or management do not challenge or constrain innovative projects. According to the 
reasoning above, we develop the following hypotheses: 
H1a: Smaller size of the hospital board is positively related to innovation. 
H1b: Hospitals where the CEO has a dual role is positively related to innovation. 
 
Information transparency and innovation 
In complex organizations, such as hospitals, assessment of innovation is challenging partially attributed to 
information transparency. The lack of transparency was one of the most cited problems by the chairmen 
of the medical council with regard to assessing innovation.[8] Information transparency is classified in 3 
ways: finance, health quality, and accounting and audit system. With regard to financial transparency, the 
board's responsibility is to set up planning and budgeting processes that monitor and report on the status 
of innovation programs.[17] In the process of innovation management, boards are required to conduct 
reviews to identify variances in financial performance and take corrective action if necessary. Thus, in 
order to support hospital innovation, financial measurement and transparency will provide more visibility 
to relevant stakeholders who have the influence and resources to further assist with adapting innovative 
programs. 
With regard to quality, the hospital board's responsibility is to create a supportive and collaborative 
environment focused on continuous quality improvement.[18] More importantly, the board has legal 
accountability for ensuring the hospital meets acceptable standards of quality of care delineated in 
statutory law, regulatory requirements, and accreditation standards.[19] Freedman[20] states hospitals 




accountability. Also, there is increasing public pressures to report on quality of care that is facilitating 
hospital innovation[21] by allowing for more exchange of information among different hospitals. 
With regard to accounting and audit system transparency, the trend toward external oversight of hospitals' 
board structure and conduct has been increasing, particularly after the Sarbanes‐ Oxley Act was passed in 
2002.[5] Although this act applies only to investor‐owned corporations, it has influenced the board 
practices of various non‐profit organizations. The IRS also has announced the development of its 2006 
Exempt Organizations Implementing Guidelines, which demonstrate increasing attention to the behavior 
of non‐profit hospitals.[5] Therefore, accounting and audit system transparency is mandatory to maintain 
legitimacy in order to acquire necessary resources to support innovation. Based on the reasoning above, 
we develop the following hypotheses: 
H2a: Greater financial transparency is positively related to hospital innovation. 
H2b: Greater health care quality transparency is positively related to innovation. 
H2c: Greater accounting and audit transparency is positively related to innovation. 
 
Decision‐making mechanisms and innovation 
A distinguishing characteristic of hospitals is that the locus of the decision making is diffuse due to 
multiple stakeholders.[22] As a result, it is imperative the board establish efficient decision making 
processes to manage innovation. The decision making processes must take into account the extent of 
board involvement, routine participation in meetings and clarity on the scope of authorization given to top 
management. Hospital board involvement in innovation projects is required to foster shared vision and 
values among employees of the organization.[23] Board involvement includes setting the expectation 
about the importance and direction of innovation initiatives.[18] This will both facilitate innovation 
adoption and increase employee commitment to innovation initiatives. Board involvement also allows the 
hospital to take advantage of external knowledge and resources to facilitate innovation. 
With regard to routine participation in decision‐making meetings, health care researchers have advocated 
the need for closer working relationships between hospital boards and top executives.[4] Traditionally, 
the hospital board's role is to “advise” or “monitor” the top management team. Recently, hospital boards 
have started routinely participating in strategic decision making in the area of innovation to remain 
competitive.[1] 
With regard to decision‐making authority, the responsibility of the hospital board is to clearly set and 
communicate the extent of CEO and management team's authority over resources dedicated to 
innovation.[8] After setting the extent of authority the board must oversee and monitor the CEO and 
management team's progress in innovation activities. More clarity and oversight provided by the board 
will facilitate and support hospital innovation. According to the reasoning above, we develop the 
following hypotheses: 
H3a: More board involvement in hospital decision making is positively related to hospital innovation. 
H3b: More routine participation in meetings by the board of directors is positively related to hospital 
innovation. 
H3c: More clarity and oversight on the scope of authorization given top management by the board is 





Sample and data 
We selected the hospital industry as our empirical setting to test the relationship between governance and 
innovation for 3 reasons. First, hospitals are under regulatory and competitive pressure to adopt 
innovations in clinical devices, equipment, surgery, pharmaceuticals, and treatment protocols requiring 
board involvement and approval. Second, specifically, hospitals in Taiwan are facing challenges in the 
area of cost containment and health care quality control pressuring hospital governance to turn to 
innovation for ongoing viability. Third, hospitals maintain detailed data on their activities.[24] 
We examine the relationship between governance mechanisms and innovation of 102 hospitals in 
Taiwan—based on an archival database of hospital evaluation from TJCHA. This database includes the 
results of hospital evaluations from year 2007 to 2010. All 102 hospitals participating in this evaluation 
are included in this study. The category types of hospital in our sample include 93 general hospitals and 9 




We use 3 exogenous latent variables based on the theoretical literature to assess hospital governance. 
They are governance structure, information transparency, and decision‐making mechanisms. The first 
latent variable is governance structure (ξ1). According to Prybil[10] and Daily et al, [13] it is measured by 
2 observed indices: the size of the board (x1) and the CEO duality (x2). The size of the board is measured 
by the number of board members. CEO duality is measured by dummy variables. If board director is also 
a CEO, we number it 1. Otherwise, it is zero. The second latent variable is information transparency (ξ2), 
according to Eeckloo et al,[8] it is measured by 3 observed indices: finance transparency (x3), health 
quality transparency (x4), and accounting and audit system transparency (x5). All 3 observed indices are 
measured by dummy variables. If finance or health quality information is available to the public, we 
number it 1. Otherwise, it is zero. If the hospital has a clear accounting and audit system, we number it 1. 
Otherwise, it is zero. The third latent variable is decision‐making mechanisms (ξ3). According to Ford‐
Eickhoff et al,[1] it is measured by 3 observed indices: board involvement (x6), clear scope of 
authorization (x7), and routine participation in decision making (x8). All 3 observed indices are measured 
by dummy variables. If board of directors are involved in hospital activities, provide clear scope of 
authorization to top management, and routinely participate in decision making, we number it 1. 
Otherwise, it is zero. 
Dependent variable 
This study used 1 endogenous latent variable based on the theoretical literature to assess hospital 
innovation (η1).[2] Unlike manufacturing firms that can measure their innovation performance directly 
from patent, published journal articles, or R&D spending, the hospital industry has relatively few 
available measures of innovation.[25] Fortunately, using rating systems as heuristic devices to assess 
healthcare providers has become common worldwide.[26] Therefore, following the recent developments 
by Salge et al,[2] the indices in this study include both science and practice based innovation on the 
behavioral patterns of creating, implementing, and diffusing new knowledge observable in the hospital 
setting. This was accomplished by adopting archival data collected (y1) by TJCHA hospital evaluation 




obtain the following ratings: pass, fair, good, very good, and excellent. We classified these ratings of 
hospital evaluation into 5‐point Likert scale ranging from pass (score 1), fair (score 2), good (score 3), 
very good (score 4), and excellent (score 5) to represent the extent of innovation. The higher score of 
hospital evaluation means the higher innovation. 
Control variables 
Hospital type and ownership are used as control variables. They are measured as dummy variables. For 
ownership, all sample hospitals were divided into either ( 1) public‐oriented or ( 2) private‐oriented 
hospital. For hospital type, all sample hospitals were divided into either ( 1) general or ( 2) psychiatric 
hospital. These measures are also collected from the TJCHA database. 
 
FINDINGS 
To translate our conceptual framework into an empirical model, we developed a measurement and a 
structural model for our data analysis. Specifically, we used the partial least squares, PLS‐Graph version 
(3.0), which provides the analysis of both a measurement model and a structural model. We selected PLS 
because it places minimal restrictions on measurement scales, sample size, and residual distribution.[27] 
It allows latent constructs to be modeled as formative or reflective indicators, as required by our model 
with a formative second‐order construct. 
Measurement model 
The adequacy of the measurement model was evaluated on the criteria of reliability, convergent validity, 
and discriminant validity. Reliability was examined using the composite reliability values, which should 
be greater than the benchmark of 0.5 to be considered adequate.[27] Table  indicates that all the values are 
above 0.5, indicating adequate reliability. In construct validation, both convergent and discriminating 
validity are analyzed. Convergent validity is measured by average variance extracted (AVE) for each 
construct during the reliability analysis that should be 0.5 or better.[28] Table  shows the AVE for the 
constructs ranged from 0.79 to 0.87, indicating a sufficient level of convergent validity of all constructs. 
To further verify discriminate validity, Fornell et al [28] advocate that correlations between items in any 2 
constructs should be lower than the square root of the AVE shared by items within a construct. As shown 
in Table 1, the square root of the AVE shared between a construct and its items was greater than the 
correlations between the construct and any other construct in the model, satisfying the Fornell et al [28] 
criteria for discriminate validity. The above results, therefore, confirm that our model encompassed 














In PLS analysis, examining the structural paths and the R2 scores of endogenous variables assesses the 
explanatory power and fit of a structural model. The results of structural path analysis are depicted in 
Figure 1. The model accounts for 21%–56% of the variance (R2 scores). Overall, the research model 
accounted for 21% of the variance of repeat efficiency of evaluation, as shown in Figure 1. Thus, the fit of 
the overall model is good. 
The pattern of direct effects revealed by the path model seems to provide somewhat mixed evidence for 
the study's hypotheses. According to Hypotheses 1a and 1b, this study expected a positive relationship 
between governance structure and hospital innovation. However, the path model reveals no significant 
correlations between governance structure and hospital innovation (t = 1.529, p > 0.1). This factor 
likewise failed to demonstrate significant correlations in the model. Therefore, Hypotheses 1a and 1b are 
not supported. 
According to Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c, a positive relationship was expected between information 
transparency and innovation. The result of the path model supported these hypotheses. There was a 
positive direct effect of information transparency on hospital innovation (t = 3.531, p < 0.01). Hypothesis 
3a, 3b, and 3c proposed that there is a positive effect of decision‐making mechanisms on hospital 
innovation. The path model showed a positive effect of decision‐making mechanisms on hospital 
innovativeness (t = 3.458, p < 0.01). Thus, the results of the path model support these hypotheses. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The aim of this study is to propose a conceptual framework to represent hospital governance and 
empirically examine its effect on hospital innovation. We represent hospital governance as comprised of 
governance structure, information transparency, and decision‐making mechanisms. Our findings suggest 
that certain hospital governance mechanisms, information transparency and decision‐making 
mechanisms, influence hospital innovation. However, governance structure has no such effect. This result 
suggests that the structure per se may not be a critical factor for promoting hospital innovation. Regarding 
the insignificance of size of board, we suggest that balancing size with inclusivity may have better impact 
on its innovation than size only. In the UK NHS, for example, governance boards incorporate both 
nonexecutive directors and community governance. The diversity of board member may stimulate novel 
idea for further innovation.[29] Regarding the insignificance of CEO duality, we believe the other side of 
the argument that a rather insulated “view of the world” of the CEO also fulfills the role of governance 
chair may lead to dysfunctional hospital governance that further impact hospital innovation. In sum, the 
results are generally consistent with agency theory,[30] which states that institutional arrangements of 
hospital governance have comparative advantages in solving the agency problems, thereby enhancing the 
hospital's propensity for innovation. 
The contribution of this article is that we use agency theory to conceptualize the relationship between 
hospital governance and innovation for hospital organizations. Currently, there is limited research on 
governance mechanisms and innovation in hospitals. Therefore, more generally this study contributes to 
the field of health care management by demonstrating the impact governance mechanisms can have on 
innovation. Moreover, from a methods perspective, this study provides specific indices to measure 




Our findings demonstrate that hospital governance mechanisms can have a positive effect on innovation. 
This information can be useful to hospital boards and executive management who are interested in 
facilitating innovation in their organizations. Specifically, in order to increase innovation, hospital boards 
can provide greater information transparency to the public in the areas of finance, health care quality, and 
accounting and audit systems. Also, hospital boards can enhance the decision making processes in the 
area of innovation to include more board member involvement, set clear authorization scope for executive 
management, and more routinely participate in strategic decision making to support innovative initiatives. 
Finally, hospital boards need to consider developing a variety of indices measuring hospital innovation in 
the science and practice areas for reporting and monitoring ongoing progress. 
There are several limitations in this study. First, we measure hospital innovation using 1 specific rating 
scale over a fixed time period. This measure may not capture all aspects of innovation that can be 
influenced by board governance. We recommend a greater variety of innovation measures are included in 
future studies. Second, our data are from the hospital industry in Taiwan, thereby limiting our 
generalizability in 2 key areas. First, our sample data are from Taiwan and hospital governance in other 
countries could be operating differently. Second, our results are in the hospital industry and may not apply 
to other health care provider organization such as nursing homes, rehabilitation centers, and skilled 
nursing facilities. Future studies can explore the use of our measures and model in other countries and 
types of health care provider organizations. Our expectation is that future studies will further develop and 
test our conceptual constructs that will lead to the development of a more robust and informative model 
that will allow the governance function to facilitate innovation in healthcare management. 
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